







framework	 focuses	 on	 deterring	 rational	 bad	 actors	 who	 must	 be	
constrained	 from	acting	on	 their	worst	 impulses.	 	 This	 overlooks	a	 less	
sinister,	but	more	endemic	species	of	fraud	that	is	not	driven	by	greed	or	
the	desire	to	take	advantage	of	others.			Prosocial	 fraud	 is	 induced	 by	
prosocial	 motives	 and	 propagated	 through	 cooperative	 norms.	 	 This	
Article	argues	that	prosocial	fraud	cannot	be	effectively	deterred	through	
increased	 sanctions	 because	 its	 moral	 ambiguity	 lends	 itself	 to	 self-
deception	and	motivated	blindness.			The	 presence	 of	 a	 beneficiary	 other	
than	 the	 self	 allows	 individuals	 to	 supplant	 one	 source	 of	 morality	
(honesty),	 with	 another	 (benevolence),	 providing	 a	 powerful	 source	 of	
rationalization	that	weakens	the	deterrent	impact	of	legal	sanctions.		
After	examining	the	types	of	motives	that	typify	prosocial	fraud,	this	
Article	 identifies	 structural	 and	 situational	 factors—definitional	
ambiguity,	incrementalism,	and	third-party	complicity—that	increase	its	
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The	 public’s	 response	 reflects	 simplistic	 assumptions	 about	
fraudulent	behavior,	assumptions	that	are	deeply	embedded	in	the	law.		
According	to	this	narrative,	individuals	commit	fraud	for	two	reasons:	
(1)	 a	 flawed,	 dishonest	 character;	 and	 (2)	 greed.1	 	 The	 sensational,	
massive	 fraud	 prosecutions	 of	 the	 past	 century—Bernie	 Madoff,	










actor	 theory	 of	 fraud.	 	 Under	 this	 view,	 because	 it	 is	 rational	 for	 an	
individual	 to	 cheat	 while	 others	 cooperate,	 the	 law	 must	 impose	
penalties	 to	 deter	 fraud.	 	 Optimally,	 sanctions	 are	 set	 at	 a	 level	 that	
aligns	individual	interests	with	collective	ones,	making	it	rational	not	to	
cheat.	 	A	system	of	informal	sanctions—gossip	and	social	ostracism—
complement	 the	 formal	 ones,	 further	 increasing	 the	 costliness	 of	
defection.	
Yet	 the	 stubborn	 persistence	 of	 fraud	 suggests	 a	 fundamental	
disconnect	 between	 theory	 and	 practice.	 	 In	 theory,	 fear	 of	
imprisonment,	 combined	with	 hefty	 fines	 and	 the	 prospect	 of	 public	
humiliation	ought	 to	dissuade	all	 but	 the	most	depraved	hearts	 from	




in	 which	 numerous	 individuals	 either	 actively	 participate	 or	 are	











an	 individual’s	 character,	 signaling	 dishonesty,	 opportunism,	 and	
untrustworthiness.	 	Because	fraud	is	undefined	by	design,	 individuals	
are	left	to	rely	on	intuition	and	a	general	awareness	of	social,	moral,	and	
religious	 proscriptions	 against	 lying,	 cheating,	 and	 advantage-taking.		
The	 opacity	 of	 the	 legal	 standard,	 however,	 makes	 it	 particularly	













to	 explore	 the	 influence	of	 prosocial	motives	 on	 fraudulent	 behavior.		
The	current	legal	framework	is	tailored	primarily	toward	the	atomistic,	




fraudster,	 focusing	 instead	on	one	type	of	non-calculative	 fraudster—
the	prosocial	fraudster.		Prosocial	fraud	appears	to	be	a	contradiction	in	





Emerging	 research	 suggests	 that	 prosocial	 fraud	 is	 a	 far	 more	
prevalent	 and	 compelling	 force	 than	 previously	 recognized,	 afflicting	




their	 moral	 and	 practical	 force.	 	 Accordingly,	 the	 current	 incentive-
based	 approach,	 which	 relies	 heavily	 on	 definitional	 ambiguity	 and	
prosecutorial	 discretion	 to	 address	 different	 species	 of	 fraud,	 is	
particularly	ill-equipped	to	deal	with	prosocial	fraud.		
This	 Article	 argues	 that	 the	 deterrent	 aims	 of	 the	 current	 legal	
framework	 cannot	 be	 fully	 achieved	 without	 accounting	 for	 the	




prosocial	 behavior.	 	 But	 in	 the	 context	 of	 prosocial	 fraud,	 intrinsic	
motivation	and	social	sanctions	often	undercut	the	effectiveness	of	legal	
sanctions.		This	Article	explores	this	inherent	tension.	











that	 the	 moral	 ambiguity	 of	 prosocial	 fraud	 facilitates	 self-deceptive	
rationalizations	that	do	not	respond	to	increased	sanctions.		
Part	 I	 analyzes	 the	 role	 of	 intrinsic	motivation,	 arguing	 that	 the	
impulse	 to	 help	 can	 often	 override	 the	 impulse	 to	 act	 ethically.	 	 It	
identifies	 mechanisms	 of	 self-deception	 and	 catalogues	 the	 types	 of	
prosocial	motives	that	can	lead	to	fraudulent	behavior.		Part	II	discusses	
certain	 structural	 and	 situational	 factors—definitional	 ambiguity,	
incrementalism,	 and	 third-party	 complicity—that	 increase	 the	
prevalence	of	prosocial	fraud.		Part	III	sets	out	a	normative	framework	
for	curbing	prosocial	fraud	through	ex	ante	private	enforcement.		Parts	
I	 and	 II	 highlight	 the	 inadequacy	 of	 direct	 deterrence,	 attempting	 to	
answer	 the	 question	 of	 why	 prosocial	 fraud	 should	 be	 treated	
differently.		Part	III	deals	with	how	it	can	be	curtailed,	focusing	on	the	
comparative	 advantages	 of	 third-party	 monitors	 in	 disrupting	
misconduct.	
II.		INTRINSIC	MOTIVATION	




In	 recent	 years,	 researchers	 in	 psychology,	 economics,	 behavioral	
ethics,	 and	 other	 disciplines	 have	 demonstrated	 that	 numerous	
psychological	mechanisms	 and	 processes	 underlie	 unethical	 conduct.		
Not	 only	 are	many	 bad	 acts	 not	 the	 product	 of	 rational,	 deliberative	




Accumulating	 evidence	 suggests	 that	 individuals’	 emotional,	
unconscious,	 and	 affective	 states	 play	 a	 far	 more	 prevalent	 role	 in	
unethical	behavior	than	previously	thought.4		A	combination	of	explicit	
and	 implicit	 mental	 processes	 impact	 behavior:5	 the	 mechanistic,	
automatic,	heuristic,	and	unconscious	system	on	the	one	hand	(“System	








(“System	 2”).6	 	 Automatic	 and	 deliberate	 processes	 “often	 work	 in	
concert	to	produce	judgments	and	decisions.”7		Under	the	conventional	




In	 recent	 years,	 behavioral	 ethicists	 have	 demonstrated	 that	
unethical	behavior	can	result	from	automatic	and	reflexive	processes.10		
Individuals	make	many	decisions	and	take	many	actions	on	the	basis	of	
impulse	 and	 intuition.11	 	 Many	 moral	 judgments	 result	 from	 “quick,	
automatic,	evaluations”	that	are	justified	and	rationalized	post	hoc.12		In	
social	 contexts,	 people	 tend	 not	 to	 make	 calculated	 utilitarian	
judgments,	but	 instead	respond	 intuitively	 to	“up	close	and	personal”	
aspects	of	their	environment.13		Individuals	often	have	reflexive	feelings	
about	reciprocity,	loyalty,	equality,	or	suffering	that	are	shaped	by	social	
and	 cultural	 forces.14	 	 Prosocial	 impulses—not	 just	 self-interest—can	
motivate	 unethical	 behavior	 under	 System	 1	 automatic	 processes.		
When	 automatic	 and	 controlled	 judgments	 conflict,	 automatic	
processing	 often	 prevails.15	 	 Moreover,	 some	 individuals	 may	 act	
unethically	 without	 full	 consciousness	 that	 they	 are	 doing	 so.16		
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In	 addition,	 psychological	 mechanisms	 such	 as	 motivated	
reasoning	and	self-deception	can	undermine	the	deterrent	effect	of	legal	
and	 social	 sanctions.	 	 Motivated	 reasoning	 refers	 to	 how	motivation	
affects	 reasoning	 by	 influencing	 the	 types	 of	 information	 that	
individuals	pay	 attention	 to	 and	 rely	 on.18	 	When	 individuals	wish	 to	
arrive	at	a	particular	 conclusion,	 they	construct	 justifications	 for	 that	
conclusion	by	accessing	only	a	biased	subset	of	relevant	information.19		
“In	other	words,	one’s	preferred	course	of	action	provides	a	directional	
motivation	 to	 search	 for,	 attend	 to,	 and	 weight	 more	 heavily	 any	
evidence	that	supports	the	preference.”20		Accordingly,	people	are	more	
likely	to	arrive	at	conclusions	they	wish	to	arrive	at.21		
These	 findings	 are	 consistent	 with	 other	 studies	 showing	 that	
individuals’	 perceptions	 of	 their	 own	 morality	 are	 highly	 fluid	 and	
pliable,	 impacting	 future	 behavior.22	 	 Individuals	 manage	 their	
memories	to	maintain	a	favorable	self-image.		Those	who	have	engaged	
in	 dishonesty	 often	 engage	 in	 “moral	 forgetting”—unconsciously	
forgetting	or	misremembering	actual	behavior	and	moral	norms	meant	
to	guide	that	behavior.23		As	Max	Bazerman	and	Ann	Tenbrunsel	noted,	




overlooking	 the	 ethical	 dimension	 of	 a	 decision	 to	 avoid	 the	 moral	
implications	 of	 that	 decision.25	 	 Self-deception—“active	
misrepresentation	 of	 reality	 to	 the	 conscious	 mind”	 or	 “lying	 to	
oneself”—allows	individuals	to	disregard	accurate	assessments	of	their	
behavior.26	 	 Self-serving	 justifications	allow	 individuals	 to	act	 in	 their	
 




Moral	 Choice,	 123	ORG.	BEHAV.	&	HUM.	DECISION	 PROCESSES	 138,	 140	 (2014)	 (citations	
omitted).		
	 21	 Kunda,	supra	note	18,	at	495.	
	 22	 See	 Jennifer	 Jordan	 et	 al.,	 The	 Moral	 Self-Image	 Scale:	 Measuring	 and	
Understanding	the	Malleability	of	the	Moral	Self,	6	FRONTIERS	PSYCH.	1,	1	(2015).	
	 23	 Lisa	L.	Shu	&	Francesca	Gino,	Sweeping	Dishonesty	Under	the	Rug:	How	Unethical	









self-interest	 without	 feeling	 or	 appearing	 immoral.	 	 Similarly,	 third	
parties	are	more	likely	to	excuse	or	overlook	such	behavior.27	
B.		Motive	
This	 research	 suggests	 that	 assumptions	 implicit	 in	 the	 legal	
system’s	 treatment	 of	 fraud	 are	 deeply	 flawed.	 	 The	 law	 largely	
disregards	 motive,	 but	 motive	 profoundly	 influences	 an	 individual’s	
perception	 of	 his	 or	 her	 own	 culpability.	 	 Individuals	 evaluate	 the	
morality	of	their	own	actions	differently	when	those	actions	derive	from	
prosocial	motives.28		An	intent	to	mislead	is	an	element	of	fraud	in	the	
common	 law	 of	 crimes	 and	 torts,	 but	 the	 motive	 for	 intentional	
misrepresentations	 is	 not	 an	 element	 of	 fraud.	 	 Common	 law	 fraud	
requires	 a	 showing	 of	 knowledge	 of	 the	 representation’s	 falsity	 or	
reckless	 disregard	 of	 its	 truth	 and	 an	 intent	 to	 deceive	 the	 victim.29		
Intent	 refers	 to	 an	 actor’s	 state	 of	 mind—whether	 the	 act	 was	
performed	 purposefully,	 knowingly,	 or	 recklessly.	 	 Motive,	 however,	
refers	to	a	defendant’s	reasons	for	acting.30		A	growing	body	of	research	
indicates	 that	 motives	 other	 than	 greed—in	 particular,	 prosocial	
motives	 such	 as	 altruism,	 equity,	 collegiality,	 loyalty,	 and	 love—may	
have	a	significant	impact	on	fraudulent	behavior.		





that	 individuals	 have	 been	willing	 to	 lie,	 cheat,	 and	 commit	 fraud	 to	
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other	 prosocial	 behaviors,	 it	 may	 also	 drive	 dishonest	 behavior.		
Empathy	 may	 be	 defined	 as	 “a	 vicarious	 emotion	 that	 one	 person	
experiences	 when	 reflecting	 on	 the	 emotion	 of	 another,”33	 or	
understanding	and	relating	to	the	situation	of	others.34		It	is	“a	second-
order,	 affective	 response	 to	 another’s	 pain”35	 or	 an	 other-oriented	
emotional	 response	 to	 others’	 welfare—e.g.,	 feeling	 sympathetic	 and	
compassionate	 towards	 another	 in	 need.36	 	 It	 has	 thus	 been	 used	
interchangeably	 with	 terms	 such	 as	 sympathy,	 compassion,	 and	
kindness.37	 	 It	 is	 technically	 not	 itself	 an	 emotion,	 but	 a	 means	 of	
processing	and	experiencing	the	emotions	of	others.38	




“behavior	 that	 benefits	 another	 organism,	 not	 closely	 related,	 while	
being	 apparently	 detrimental	 to	 the	 organism	 performing	 the	
behavior”;42	 “self-destructive	 behavior	 performed	 for	 the	 benefit	 of	
others”;43	or	“a	motivational	state	with	the	ultimate	goal	of	increasing	
another’s	welfare.”44	 	 In	contrast	to	benevolence,	 it	generally	requires	
 
	 33	 Jesse	Prinz,	Against	Empathy,	49	S.J.	PHIL.	214,	214	(2011).	
	 34	 See	 Lynne	 N.	 Henderson,	 Legality	 and	 Empathy,	 85	 MICH.	 L.	 REV.	 1574,	 1576	
(1987).	
	 35	 See	Robert	B.	Cialdini,	Altruism	or	Egoism?	That	 Is	 (Still)	 the	Question,	 2	PSYCH.	
INQUIRY	124,	124	(1991).	
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guilt.48	 	 By	 focusing	 on	 how	 their	 actions	 are	 benefiting	 others,	
individuals	are	able	 to	view	 their	actions	 in	positive	 terms	and	avoid	
negatively	 impacting	 their	 moral	 self-image.49	 	 When	 faced	 with	
competing	moral	principles—honesty	versus	benevolence—individuals	
prioritizing	 benevolence	 over	 honesty	 feel	 they	 have	 acted	 morally.		
Indeed,	some	evidence	exists	that	people	view	individuals	with	altruistic	
intentions—those	who	 lie	 to	 help	 others—as	more	moral	 than	 those	
who	choose	honesty	over	benevolence.50		
Similarly,	considerable	research	has	shown	that	when	individuals	
feel	 empathy	 for	 others	 in	 need,	 they	 act	 to	 increase	 others’	welfare,	
even	at	a	cost	 to	 themselves.51	 	When	 individuals	 feel	empathy	 for	 “a	
particular	 individual	 experiencing	 a	 particular	 need	 in	 a	 particular	
situation,”	they	often	seek	to	benefit	that	individual	to	the	detriment	of	
others.52	 	 Experimental	 subjects	 induced	 to	 feel	 empathy	 are	
significantly	 more	 likely	 to	 engage	 in	 unethical	 behavior.53	 	 In	 low-




































were	 relatively	 healthy	 in	 order	 to	 assure	 their	 patients’	 access	 to	
livers.60	 	Similar	instances	of	empathetic	fraud	are	common,	including	
false	 reporting	 of	 diagnoses	 on	 hospital	 claims61	 and	 auditors’	
misrepresentation	of	client	finances.62	
2.		Equity	
Empathy	and	altruism	may	also	play	 a	 role	 in	dishonest	helping	
behavior	motivated	by	the	desire	to	restore	equity.63		Whereas	negative	
inequity	produces	feelings	of	envy,	positive	inequity	induces	feelings	of	
guilt,	 which	 motivates	 individuals	 to	 dishonestly	 help	 others.64		
Particularly	where	 the	 risks	 of	 being	 caught	 are	 low,	 individuals	 are	




















Moreover,	 when	 individuals	 act	 dishonestly	 to	 restore	 equity,	 they	
subjectively	“discount	the	immorality	of	their	actions.”66	
Take,	 for	 instance,	 fraud	 in	 the	vehicle	emissions	 testing	market.		




making	 temporary	 adjustments	 or	 by	 simply	 substituting	 other	 cars	
during	testing.68		Financial	incentives	to	cheat	also	exist—customers	are	
more	 likely	 to	 return	 to	 inspection	 firms	 that	have	previously	passed	
them,	 and	 older	 cars	 with	 problems	 tend	 to	 need	 future	mechanical	
repairs.69	 	 Financial	 self-interest,	 however,	 does	 not	 fully	 explain	
existing	data.	
In	 the	strictly	regulated	emissions	 testing	market,	 inspectors	are	
prohibited	 from	 systematically	 treating	 certain	 types	 of	 cars	 more	
leniently	 than	 others.70	 	 Yet,	 a	 notable	 number	 of	 emissions	 testers	
illegally	assist	customers	driving	standard	vehicles	over	those	driving	
luxury	 ones.	 	 In	 a	 series	 of	 laboratory	 studies,	 Gino	 and	 Pierce	
manipulated	and	measured	how	emotions	such	as	envy	and	empathy	
influenced	individuals’	propensity	to	illegally	help	their	peers.71	 	They	
found	 that	 individuals’	 likelihood	 of	 illicitly	 assisting	 others	 varied	
based	 on	 the	 beneficiary’s	wealth,	with	 the	majority	 illegally	 helping	
those	 who	 exhibited	 less	 wealth.72	 	 These	 results	 demonstrate	 that	


























of	 others.	 	 If	 they	 perceive	 inequity	 in	 these	 ratios,	 they	 respond	 by	
modifying	 their	 inputs	 or	 withdrawing.76	 	 Other	 studies	 have	
demonstrated	that	inequity	generates	emotional	reactions	that	result	in	
dishonest	 helping	 or	 hurting	 behavior.77	 	 Even	 more	 surprisingly,	
individuals	 “judge	 actions	 that	 restore	 equity	 as	morally	 appropriate	
and	ethical	even	when	they	involve	lying	and	stealing.”78	
3.		Loyalty	and	Sense	of	Belonging	
Individuals	may	also	engage	 in	 fraud	out	of	a	 sense	of	 loyalty	 to	
their	organization,	friends,	families,	or	other	group	members.79		Studies	




behavior	 appears	 “to	 shift	 with	 the	 inclinations	 of	 the	 respective	
employer.”82	 	Moreover,	 loyalty	 influences	the	way	people	 judge	their	
own	 behavior—those	 who	 are	 dishonest	 out	 of	 loyalty	 to	 their	
organization,	 family,	 or	 group	 feel	 they	 acted	 ethically	 and	morally.83		
When	evaluating	the	behavior	of	others,	outsiders	view	loyalty-driven	



























to	 rationalize	 their	 unethical	 behavior	 and	 maintain	 a	 positive	 self-
image.86	 	 Individuals	 fear	 the	 consequences	 of	 disloyalty—disgust,	
contempt,	moral	 outrage,	 and	 social	 ostracism—and	 therefore	 act	 to	
support	their	group.87	
Many	examples	exist	of	individuals	who	commit	fraud	out	of	loyalty	
to	 friends,	 colleagues,	 or	 loved	 ones.	 	 Often,	 white-collar	 criminals	
initiate	 their	 schemes	 by	 taking	 advantage	 of	 friendships	 and	 family	




fascinating	 aspect	 of	 the	 case	 was	 not	 the	 brazenness	 of	 the	 illicit	
activity—he	was	photographed	accepting	bags	of	 cash	 in	a	Starbucks	




from	 $50,000	 to	 $70,000,	were	 relatively	 small	 in	 comparison	 to	 his	
estimated	$650,000	to	$900,000	annual	salary.90		London	did	not	need	
the	 cash	 and	 did	 not	 use	 the	 Rolex	 watch,	 having	 always	 preferred	
watches	with	leather	bands.91		In	later	interviews,	London	rationalized,	
“I	was	thinking	about	trying	to	help	out	a	friend.		I	thought	what	we	were	













(Apr.	 24,	 2014),	 https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-kpmg-london-20140425-
story.html.	
	 90	 See	id.		
	 91	 See	Quentin	Fottrell,	Confessions	of	 Insider	Trader	Scott	London,	MARKET	WATCH	








The	 need	 to	 belong	 is	 “a	 fundamental	 human	 motivation”:	 “human	
beings	have	a	pervasive	drive	to	form	and	maintain	at	least	a	minimum	
quantity	 of	 lasting,	 positive,	 and	 significant	 interpersonal	
relationships.”94		Indeed,	“much	of	what	human	beings	do	is	done	in	the	
service	 of	 belongingness.”95	 	 Individuals	 are	 extremely	 averse	 to	
breaking	 social	 bonds,	 reacting	 with	 distress	 and	 resistance	 to	 the	
ending	of	relationships,	even	temporary	ones.96		Perhaps	one	of	the	most	







This	 same	need	 for	 solidarity,	belongingness,	 and	group	 identity	
may	 explain	 participation	 and	 complicity	 in	 fraudulent	 schemes.		
Perhaps	 one	 of	 the	most	 disturbing	 and	 shocking	 aspects	 of	massive	
organizational	fraud	is	the	sheer	breadth	and	extent	of	the	fraud.		Rarely	
is	it	ever	the	case	of	a	few	bad	apples.		Individuals	go	to	extraordinary	
lengths	 to	 help	 their	 colleagues,	 even	when	 doing	 so	 violates	moral,	
social,	and	legal	proscriptions	against	lying,	cheating,	and	stealing.		Even	
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(1994).		
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Bernie	 Madoff,	 and	 other	 major	 fraud	 scandals	 could	 not	 have	 been	
effectuated	without	 the	 cooperation	 of	 numerous	 employees	 over	 an	
extended	 period.	 	 In	 Madoff’s	 case,	 members	 of	 his	 inner	 circle—
including	 his	 secretary,	 back-office	workers,	 computer	 programmers,	
and	other	employees—willfully	lied,	falsified	documents,	hid	evidence,	
and	back-dated	 transactions.103	 	More	recently,	 in	 June	2019,	 the	SEC	
charged	KPMG	LLP	with	altering	past	audit	work	after	KPMG	obtained	
confidential	Public	Company	Accounting	Oversight	Board	(PCAOB)	lists	
of	 inspection	 targets.104	 	 In	an	elaborate	scheme,	KPMG	auditors	who	





Finally,	 the	 impulse	 to	 help	 those	 we	 love	 can	 be	 a	 powerful	
motivator.		Fraud	motivated	by	love	is	particularly	insidious	because	the	
emotional	 and	 social	 bonds	 that	 initially	 induce	 the	 fraud	 also	make	
deterrence	more	elusive.		The	2019	college	admissions	scandal,	in	which	
dozens	 of	 parents	 conspired	 to	 fraudulently	 have	 their	 children	
admitted	 to	 top	 colleges	 and	universities,	 has	 been	 reviled	 as	 brazen	
illustrations	of	dishonesty,	corruption,	privilege,	and	entitlement.106		For	
the	 ultra-rich,	 getting	 into	 an	 elite	 college	 conferred	 social	 standing,	
status,	 privilege,	 and	 bragging	 rights.107	 	 But	 what	 else	 could	 have	
motivated	 these	 otherwise	 law-abiding,	 prominent,	 and	 wealthy	
parents	to	risk	everything	to	get	their	children	into	the	school	of	their	




	 103	 See	 Rodger	 Adair,	 Bernie	 Madoff’s	 Inner	 Circle:	 Cases	 and	 Commentaries,	 in	
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	 104	 See	 Press	Release,	 Sec.	&	Exch.	Comm’n,,	KPMG	Paying	$50	Million	Penalty	 for	











loved	 ones	 succeed.108	 	 They	 were	 invested	 in	 every	 aspect	 of	 their	
children’s	 lives,	 proactively	 intervening	 and	 implementing	 fixes	




Acceptance	 rates	 at	 highly	 selective	 colleges	 plummeted,	making	 the	
“college	admissions	mania”	a	crisis	for	the	roughly	3	percent	of	students	
aspiring	 to	 schools	 admitting	 fewer	 than	 half	 their	 applicants.110		
Parents	were	led	“to	believe	that	the	elite	colleges	are	the	only	choices	
for	their	student	to	have	the	best	education	and	to	‘make	it’	in	life	and	in	
their	 chosen	 career	 path.”111	 	 Watching	 other	 parents	 go	 to	
extraordinary	lengths	to	help	their	children	get	ahead	created	a	sense	of	










benevolence	 and	 care—can	 eclipse	 legal	 strictures.	 	 In	 moral	
psychology,	 justice	and	care	have	 formed	two	central	pillars	of	moral	
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	 112	 KORN	&	LEVITZ,	supra	note	107,	at	77.	








protecting	 individuals,	 they	 vary	 in	 the	 primacy	 accorded	 to	 each	





believe	 that	 morality	 requires	 performing	 the	 act	 with	 the	 best	
consequences.120	 	 Utilitarianism,	 the	 most	 famous	 consequentialist	
theory,	holds	that	an	act	is	right	if	and	only	if	it	results	in	the	greatest	
total	 amount	of	well-being.121	 	Under	 this	view,	 the	ethicality	of	 lying	
ultimately	 depends	 on	 its	 consequences.	 Lies	 that	 help	 others	 may	
therefore	be	justified.122	
In	situations	where	justice/honesty	and	care/benevolence	conflict,	
some	 individuals	 instinctively	 privilege	 benevolence	 over	 honesty.123		
Emerging	research	indicates	that	individuals	judge	deception	motivated	










of	 legal	 sanctions.	 	This	Part	 identifies	 three	 factors	 that	 increase	 the	






















of	 novel	 and	 constantly	 evolving	 forms	 of	 wrongdoing.	 	 Black’s	 Law	





gain,	 some	 undue	 advantage	 to	 himself,	 or	 to	 work	 some	




Others	have	defined	 fraud	as	any	attempt	 to	 “gain	an	advantage	over	




With	 such	 a	 broad	 standard,	 however,	 it	 is	 unclear	 what	 the	
distinction	 is	 between	 lying	 and	 deceit.129	 	 Lying	 can	 be	 viewed	 as	 a	
subset	of	deception,	but	deception	does	not	necessarily	 involve	 lying.		
“Lying”	has	been	defined	as	 “a	 statement	made	by	one	who	does	not	
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The	 basic	 elements	 are	 a	 false	 statement	 and	 an	 intent	 to	 mislead.		
Although	 lying	 is	 viewed	 as	 wrongful	 conduct,	 the	 law	 does	 not	
proscribe	it	except	in	certain	contexts,	such	as	perjury	or	defamation.		
Deception,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 can	 involve	 not	 only	 affirmative	
misrepresentations,	 but	 also	 omissions	 and	 non-verbal	 behavior.132		





requisite	 elements	 of	 common	 law	 civil	 fraud	 include	 an	 affirmative	





The	 current	 structural	 framework	 consists	 of	 subject-specific	
definitions	superimposed	on	catch-all	generic	definitions,	such	as	mail	
fraud,137	wire	fraud,138	and	conspiracy	to	defraud.139	 	The	statutes	are	








Under	 What	 Circumstances,	 If	 Any,	 Should	 Lies	 Be	 Made	 Criminal,	 101	 J.	 CRIM.	 L.	 &	
CRIMINOLOGY	529,	533	(2011).	






fraudulent	 misrepresentation);	 RESTATEMENT	 (SECOND)	 OF	 CONTRACTS	 §	 162	 (1981)	
(defining	when	a	misrepresentation	is	fraudulent	or	material).	









schemes	 that	 were	 using	 the	 postal	 system,”141	 it	 has	 since	 been	
expanded	to	encompass	any	fraudulent	schemes	utilizing	an	interstate	
carrier.142		The	government	need	only	show	(1)	a	scheme	to	defraud,	(2)	
intent	 to	 defraud,	 and	 (3)	 use	 of	 the	mails	 to	 further	 the	 fraudulent	
scheme.143	 	 The	 wire	 fraud	 statute	 is	 similarly	 broad	 in	 scope,	
prohibiting	“any	scheme	or	artifice	to	defraud,	or	[to	obtain]	money	or	
property	by	means	of	false	or	fraudulent	pretenses	.	.	.	by	means	of	wire,	
radio,	 or	 television	 communication	 in	 interstate	 or	 foreign	
commerce.”144		In	contrast	to	common	law	civil	fraud,	federal	criminal	
fraud	does	not	require	a	showing	of	reliance	or	detriment.145		
Other	 fraud	 statutes,	 such	 as	 computer	 fraud,146	 health	 care	
fraud,147	bank	fraud,148	and	securities	fraud,149	focus	on	specific	types	of	
fraud.	 	 For	 instance,	 the	 bank	 fraud	 statute	 prohibits	 schemes	 to	
“defraud	 a	 financial	 institution”	 and	 schemes	 to	 obtain	 money	 or	








inconsistent	 body	 of	 common	 law	 characterized	 by	 a	 progressive	
blurring	of	the	civil-criminal	divide.153		The	job	of	policing	this	divide	has	
fallen	on	prosecutors,	who	individually	make	subjective	determinations	





















bureaucratic	 or	 personal	 incentives	 to	 selectively	 prosecute	 higher	
profile	defendants,	resulting	in	sporadic	and	uneven	enforcement.154		
In	addition,	a	lack	of	statutory	gradation	facilitates	the	motivational	
biases	 discussed	 above.155	 	 The	 current	 statutory	 scheme	 fails	 to	
distinguish	 low-level	 fraud	 from	massive,	 organizational	 fraud,	 other	
than	at	 the	sentencing	stage.	 	As	Miriam	Baer	has	noted,	“There	 is	no	
such	thing	as	first-	or	second-degree	mail	or	wire	fraud.		Rather,	all	of	
the	major	fraud	offenses,	whether	they	threaten	the	evisceration	of	an	
entire	 industry	 or	 defraud	 an	 unfortunate	 few,	 fit	 under	 the	 same	
statutory	 umbrella.”156	 	 When	 all	 the	 variegated	 forms	 of	 fraud	 are	
subsumed	under	one	category—the	“scheme	or	artifice	to	defraud”—it	
creates	problems	of	identification,	monitoring,	and	deterrence.		
Consider	 gradations	 of	 intent.	 	 Federal	 fraud	 law	 criminalizes	
“willful	[and]	specific	intent	to	defraud.”157		But	courts	interpreted	this	
language	very	broadly	 to	 include	not	only	purposeful	 frauds,	but	also	
impulsive	and	reckless	ones.		For	instance,	statements	made	in	reckless	
disregard	 of	 their	 truth	 satisfy	 the	 requirement	 of	 purposefully	
deceptive	 conduct.158	 	 Similarly,	 conspiracy	 and	 accomplice	 liability	
statutes	do	not	distinguish	states	of	mind	and	“treat	accomplices	and	
principals	identically.”159	 	But	studies	have	shown	that	many	ordinary	
people	 engage	 in	 fraud	 non-deliberatively,	 and	 sometimes	
subconsciously.160	 	 When	 the	 law	 conflates	 the	 reluctant,	 non-
calculative	 fraudster	 with	 the	 calculative	 one,	 individuals	 are	 more	
likely	 to	 engage	 in	 motivated	 reasoning	 and	 euphemistic	
categorizations.		
Rather	 than	 deterring	 individuals	 from	 acting	 opportunistically,	
this	 ambiguity	 in	 the	 substance,	 structure,	 and	 contours	 of	 fraud	 can	
have	 the	 opposite	 effect:	 it	 can	 encourage	 individuals	 to	 choose	
interpretations	 that	 advance	 their	 self-interests.161	 	 In	 addition	 to	
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people	 to	 feel	more	 confident	 in	 their	 own	 ethicality.162	 	 Definitional	
ambiguity	 allows	 individuals	 to	 engage	 in	 “euphemistic	 labeling”	 and	
mental	 categorizing	 to	 “justify	 their	opportunistic	behaviors,”	both	 to	
themselves	and	to	others.163		For	instance,	when	stealing	is	reclassified	
as	“shifting	resources”	or	“creative	accounting,”	individuals	are	able	to	






status	 quo	 through	 minor	 changes.164	 	 Research	 demonstrates	 that	
“getting	people	to	perform	a	small,	seemingly	inconsequential	task	can	
be	 an	 effective	 strategy	 for	 changing	 subsequent	 attitudes	 and	
behaviors.”165	 	 Often,	 massive	 organizational	 fraud	 begins	 with	 a	




being	 a	 team	player.	 	Max	Bazerman	and	Ann	Tenbrunsel	 found	 that	
individuals	are	more	likely	to	accept	unethical	behavior	by	others	“as	





brokerage	 business,	 Groves	 Funding	 Corp.,	 who	 was	 sentenced	 in	
November	 2008	 for	 defrauding	 several	 financial	 institutions	 and	
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just	 fudge	 the	 number	 a	 little,	 I’ll	 fix	 this	 big	 problem.	 	 I’ll	 save	 the	
company,	save	jobs.”170		However,	the	fraud	did	not	end	there.		To	pay	
off	 the	first	 loan,	he	documented	a	 loan	for	a	 fictitious	home	with	the	
willing	 help	 of	 his	 employees	 and	 other	 companies.171	 	 Not	 a	 single	
person	whom	he	approached	expressed	any	reservations:	“They	didn’t	
see	it	as	a	crime,	but	rather	as	helping	a	friend	out	of	a	tight	spot.”172	
The	 power	 of	 incrementalism	 is	 perhaps	 most	 strikingly	
demonstrated	by	Stanley	Milgram’s	famous	experiment	on	obedience	to	
authority.	 	 Participants	 playing	 the	 role	 of	 “teacher”	 were	 told	 to	
administer	 electric	 shocks	 of	 increasing	 magnitude	 whenever	 actors	
playing	the	role	of	“learner”	answered	questions	incorrectly.173	 	While	




after	 which	 point	 the	 learner	 went	 silent	 and	 presumably	 lost	
consciousness,	each	of	the	teachers	began	by	giving	only	a	mild	shock	of	
fifteen	 volts.	 	 Teachers	 received	 instructions	 to	 punish	 subsequent	
wrong	answers	with	slightly	stronger	shocks	in	fifteen-volt	increments	
up	 to	 450	 volts.175	 	 Each	 gradual	 increase	 changed	 the	 baseline,	





and	incremental.	 	When	fraud	operates	incrementally,	 it	 is	even	more	
difficult	to	detect.		Low-level	cheating	is	notoriously	difficult	to	monitor.		
Indeed,	“[u]ncovering	evidence	of	ethically	dubious	strategies	 is	quite	
difficult	 because	 these	 practices	 are	 usually	 hidden	 under	 a	 veil	 of	
 


















by	moving	portions	 of	 its	 debt	 onto	 the	 SPVs’	 balance	 sheets.178	 	 For	
instance,	in	a	partnership	with	Blockbuster	to	provide	movies	directly	
through	 telephone	 lines,	 dubbed	 Project	 Braveheart,	 Enron	 recorded	
$110.9	 million	 in	 profits	 before	 profits	 were	 ever	 realized.179	 These	
instances	 of	 creative	 accounting	 were	 viewed	 as	 timing	 issues,	 not	








fraudster	 can	 simply	 claim	 ignorance	 or	 mistake.	 	 But	 all	 too	 often,	






to	be	punished,	 both	 formally	 through	 legal	 sanctions	 and	 informally	
through	 social	 sanctions.	 	 The	 legal	 system	 is	 constrained	 by	 finite	
resources,	 and	 as	 a	 result,	 enforcement	 tends	 to	 be	 selective	 and	
sporadic,	 with	 tremendous	 discretion	 accorded	 to	 prosecutors.	 	 The	




antifraud	 provisions	 of	 the	 securities	 laws.183	 	 If	 a	 misstatement	 or	













given	 the	 total	mix	 of	 information—it	 is	 not	 legally	 actionable.184	 	 In	
other	words,	if	a	false	statement	or	omission	is	relatively	minor,	it	will	
likely	 go	 unpunished.	 	 Where,	 as	 in	 the	 case	 of	 prosocial	 fraud,	 the	
wrongdoing	 is	morally	 ambiguous,	 the	 likelihood	 of	 prosecution	 and	
punishment	is	greatly	reduced.	
C.		Third-Party	Complicity	
While	 formal	 sanctions	 are	 constrained	 by	 resource	 limitations,	
informal	 sanctions	 tend	 to	 be	 uneven	 and	 unreliable.	 	Why	 do	 third	
parties	so	often	fail	to	sanction	dishonest	and	fraudulent	behavior?		In	
the	case	of	low-level	fraud,	third	parties	who	hear	negative	gossip	“may	
not	 be	 confident	whether	 the	 cheater	 actually	 cheated	 or	 the	 alleged	
victim	 was	 complaining	 unjustifiably	 about	 imperfect	 performance	
caused	by	a	mistake	or	some	inadvertent	or	unavoidable	situation.”185		
Concern	 for	 reputation	 does	 not	 effectively	 deter	 opportunistic	
behavior	 because	 the	 end	 result	 is	 often	 competing	 reputations,	 not	
ostracism.186	 	 Further,	 in	 many	 situations,	 wrongdoing	 occurs	 in	 the	
context	of	complex	organizations,	where	many	different	stakeholders,	
including	board	of	directors,	managers,	and	employees,	share	decision-
making	 and	 responsibility.187	 	 Diffusion	 of	 responsibility,	 in	 which	
individuals	 feel	 less	 compelled	 to	 act	 in	 the	 presence	 of	 others,	
contributes	 to	 their	 ability	 to	 morally	 disengage,	 particularly	 in	
ambiguous	 contexts.188	 	 Studies	 show	 the	 presence	 of	 others	 makes	
individuals	 feel	 less	 responsible	 for	 their	 actions,	 particularly	 the	
negative	consequences	of	group	decisions.189		
In	 addition,	 when	 offenses	 involve	 harms	 and	 victims	 that	 are	
difficult	to	identify	or	quantify—e.g.,	 loss	of	 investor	confidence—it	is	
easier	 to	morally	disengage	 from	 them.	 	Particularly	where	 there	are	
“small	harms”	to	“large	number[s]	of	victims”	that	“are	significant	only	
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and	 emotionally	 disengage	 from	 general,	 as	 opposed	 to	 specific	
targets.192		Indeed,	in	what	has	become	known	as	the	“identifiable	victim	
effect,”	Thomas	Schelling	observed	that	the	death	of	a	particular	person	






so.194	 	 Individuals	 have	 well-documented	 cognitive	 biases	 that	
predispose	them	to	“see	what	they	want	to	see”	and	“miss	contradictory	
information	 when	 it’s	 in	 their	 interest	 to	 remain	 ignorant	 .	.	.	.”195		
Indeed,	 “people	 who	 have	 a	 vested	 self-interest	 in	 a	 situation	 have	
difficulty	approaching	the	situation	without	bias,	even	when	they	view	
themselves	 as	 honest.”196	 	 Significant	 numbers	 of	 people	 routinely	
observe,	 but	 disregard—whether	 consciously	 or	 unconsciously—
unethical	behavior.197	 	Motivated	blindness	can	thus	contribute	to	the	
propagation	 of	 prosocial	 fraud	 by	 undermining	 the	 effectiveness	 of	
social	sanctions.	
Third-party	 complicity	 is	 motivated	 by	 self-interest,	 fear,	 or	
laziness,	and	 it	can	 take	a	number	of	different	 forms—the	calculating	
























avoid	 conflict	 with	 others	 in	 case	 they	 may	 be	 useful	 to	 him	 in	 the	
future.198	 	 Perhaps	 he	 believes	 that	 demonstrating	 his	 loyalty	 will	
advance	his	career	interests	and	prospects	for	advancement.		Perhaps	
he	 is	 lured	 by	 the	 prospect	 of	 financial	 enrichment	 or	 fears	 that	
confronting	the	fraud	will	be	more	costly	to	him	than	ignoring	it.	 	His	
thought	process	is	coldly	rational	and	distinctly	Machiavellian.		
The	Machiavellian	 pursuit	 of	 self-interest	 has	 become	 “uniquely	
synonymous	with	 amoral	 action,	 sharp	 dealing,	 hidden	 agendas,	 and	
unethical	 excess.”199	 	 In	 1970,	 Richard	 Christie	 and	 Florence	 Geis	
constructed	 a	 theory	 of	Machiavellianism	 that	 distinguished	between	





skill	 at	 concealing	 their	 true	 personal	 convictions.202	 	 They	 fail	 to	




in	 positions	 of	 authority.	 	 Anxious	 to	 demonstrate	 his	 loyalty,	 he	




incapable	 of	 acknowledging	 inconvenient	 information.	 	 In	 his	 classic	
study	 of	 sycophancy,	 Edward	 E.	 Jones	 identified	 three	 types	 of	
ingratiation:	 other-enhancement,	 opinion	 conformity,	 and	 self-
presentation.203		Other-enhancement	involves	flattery	and	other	efforts	
 












to	 convey	 admiration	 of	 the	 target.	 	 Opinion	 conformity	 involves	
agreeing	“with	the	target’s	attitudes,	norms,	and	beliefs.”204	 	And	self-
presentation	 refers	 to	 the	 sycophant’s	 efforts	 to	 present	 himself	 in	 a	
positive	manner.	 	 Jones	surmised	 that	 ingratiators	disguise	 their	 true	
attitudes	and	beliefs,	employing	various	strategic	tactics	to	manipulate	
others	to	view	them	favorably.205		
Research	 has	 shown	 not	 only	 that	 individuals	 are	 highly	
susceptible	 to	 flattery,	 but	 also	 that	 sycophancy	 can	 be	 effective.206		
Indeed,	 both	 laboratory	 and	 field	 studies	 indicate	 that	 “supervisor-
focused	 impression-management	 tactics”	 enhanced	 supervisor	 liking	
for	 the	 subordinate.207	 	 Liking,	 in	 turn,	 often	 translates	 into	 positive	
performance	 ratings.208	 	 Perhaps	 for	 this	 reason,	 sycophants	 in	 some	












individuals	 observe	 others’	 actions	 as	 a	 guide	 to	 how	 they	 should	





















to	 be	 liked	 and	 accepted.212	 	 Solomon	 Asch’s	 classic	 experiment	 on	
conformity	 encapsulates	 this	 mindset.	 	 For	 as	 simple	 of	 a	 task	 as	
comparing	 the	 length	 of	 different	 lines,	 approximately	 one-third	 of	
participants	 conformed	 to	 a	 clearly	 incorrect	 majority	 consensus.213		
Later	interviews	affirmed	that	the	subjects	conformed	because	(i)	they	
wanted	to	fit	in	with	the	majority;	or	(ii)	they	believed	the	majority	had	








both	 time	 and	 effort.	 	He	prefers	 to	 take	 the	path	of	 least	 resistance,	
leaving	 it	 up	 to	 others	 to	 impose	 sanctions.	 	 He	 fails	 to	 sanction	 the	
fraudster	not	because	of	the	prospect	of	personal	gain,	but	because	of	
perceived	 time	 constraints	 or	 fear	 of	 others’	 disapproval.	 	 Indeed,	





for	 self-control	 have	 been	 depleted	 by	 prior	 exertion.”218	 	 For	 third	
parties,	the	natural	inclination	to	do	nothing	is	a	powerful	one—one	that	




















If,	as	 the	emerging	research	suggests,	 the	 impulse	 to	help	others	
often	overrides	the	impulse	to	be	honest,	how	should	the	law	respond?		
The	 law	 impacts	 behavior	 directly	 through	 sanctions,	 and	 indirectly	
through	social	norms	and	intrinsic	motivation.		Prosocial	fraud	presents	
unique	 challenges	 because	 its	 defining	 characteristics—prosocial	
motivation	 and	 moral	 ambiguity—render	 it	 less	 responsive	 to	
traditional	legal	and	social	sanctions.		If	prosocial	motives	predispose	us	
to	 act	 against	 our	 rational	 self-interest,	 it	 suggests	 that	 the	 current	
incentive-based	 legal	 framework	 does	 not	 accurately	 or	 adequately	
capture	human	behavior.	 	The	law	adopts	an	atomized,	individualistic	
conception	 of	 fraudulent	 behavior:	 autonomous,	 rational	 actors	 who	
must	be	constrained	by	legal	strictures	to	curb	their	instinctive	pursuit	
of	 self-interest.	 	 Liability	 rests	on	proof	of	prescribed	and	 immutable	
formulae	centered	on	the	actor’s	 intent,	reliance,	and	loss.	 	Outside	of	
the	 sentencing	 stage,	 the	 law	 pays	 little	 attention	 to	 motive	 and	
situational	context.		
In	part,	this	formulistic	approach	is	a	product	of	necessity.		If	every	
fraud	 prosecution	 were	 saddled	 with	 fact-based	 determinations	 of	
motive	 and	 culpability,	 the	 result	 could	be	paralyzing.	 	 Evidence	of	 a	






This	Part	argues	 that	 the	solution	 is	not	 to	 supplant	 the	existing	
framework,	 but	 to	 supplement	 it.	 	 The	 first	 step	 is	 to	 recognize	 and	
understand	the	problem	of	prosocial	fraud.		Not	all	fraud	is	motivated	
by	 financial	 self-interest.	 	 Prosocially	 motivated	 fraud	 is	 particularly	
insidious	because	it	leverages	our	emotional	need	to	help	others	with	a	
psychological	 tendency	 to	 manipulate	 information	 and	 memories	 in	
self-serving	 ways.	 	 Some	 solutions	 to	 counteract	 these	 tendencies	
include	making	ethics	salient	before	actors	engage	in	decision-making	
processes,	such	as	requiring	signatures	at	the	beginning	rather	than	end	
of	 a	 self-report.219	 	 Simple	 triggers,	 such	 as	 reading	 the	 Ten	
Commandments,	have	proven	effective,	presumably	because	they	place	
 









shift	 in	 the	 values	 and	 preferences	 that	 give	 rise	 to	 prosocial	 fraud.		




of	 it.	 	 How	 can	 the	 legal	 system	 change	 the	 social	 meaning	 of	
benevolence-based	 fraud	 and	 influence	 individuals’	 beliefs	 about	 its	
inherent	morality?	 	 Below,	 I	 analyze	 two	 classic	 levers	 developed	 by	
Gary	Becker—adjusting	 the	 severity	of	punishment	versus	 increasing	
the	likelihood	of	enforcement.		After	arguing	against	the	effectiveness	of	
increased	sanctions,	this	Article	explores	the	relative	merits	of	different	





expressive	 value	 of	 harsh	 punishments,	 while	 others	 have	 cautioned	
against	the	perils	of	over-criminalizing	non-willful,	morally	ambiguous	
conduct.221		Proposed	reforms	include	systematic	accounting	of	motive	
during	 sentencing,222	 enacting	 misdemeanor	 and	 low-level	 felony	
statutes,223	 or	 individualizing	 punishment	 based	 on	
blameworthiness.224		Increasing	the	severity	of	punishment	could	have	
a	 strong	expressive	effect,	 signaling	 the	 law’s	moral	 condemnation	of	
prosocially	 motivated	 fraud.	 	 Lowered	 sanctions,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	
could	reflect	the	law’s	recognition	of	the	non-deliberative	components	
of	 prosocial	 fraud	 and	 would	 bring	 legal	 sanctions	 in	 harmony	 with	
social	sanctions	and	internal	motivation.	
But	there	are	several	reasons	that	adjusting	sanctions	may	not	have	
the	 intended	effect.	 	 First,	 prosocial	 fraud	 is	 often	not	 the	product	 of	
 













from	 fraudulent	 activity	 against	 the	 probability	 of	 getting	 caught,	
multiplied	by	the	anticipated	punishment.225		Considerable	research	has	
shown	that	this	concept	of	intent	does	not	comport	with	a	large	portion	







serve	 as	 a	 powerful	 deterrent	 to	 fraudulent	 behavior,	 but	 fraud	
continues	to	be	endemic	and	ubiquitous.		This	suggests	that	the	current	
framework	 does	 not	 adequately	 capture	 how	 and	 why	 individuals	
engage	 in	 fraudulent	 behavior.	 	 Indeed,	 “factual	 data	 on	 which	 a	
deterrent	system	must	be	founded	do	not	exist.		Reliable	findings	about	
the	marginal	 general	 deterrent	 effects	 of	 various	 types	 and	 levels	 of	
penalty	 for	various	crimes	are	hard	 to	 find.”228	 	Most	studies	 indicate	
that	 increasing	 penalties	 for	 wrongdoing	 has	 only	 a	 marginally	
deterrent	effect.229		Dishonest	behavior	does	not	appear	to	change	when	
the	magnitude	of	stakes	or	consequences	are	altered.230		Only	about	20	
percent	of	 the	population	 lie	 fully	and	consistently	when	 it	 is	 in	 their	
material	 self-interests.231	 	About	39	percent	 remain	honest	and	resist	
monetary	incentives	to	lie,	and	20	percent	of	individuals	lie	partially—
that	 is,	 they	do	not	 tell	 the	 truth,	 but	 they	 also	do	not	 lie	maximally.		
These	results	have	remained	constant	across	experiments.232			
Moreover,	 imposing	 sanctions	 can	 alter	 an	 individual’s	 decision	
frame	 from	 an	 ethical	 to	 a	 business	 one,	 reducing	 overall	 levels	 of	



















the	 introduction	 of	 a	 fine	 in	 Israeli	 day-care	 centers	 increased	 the	
incidence	 of	 tardy	 parent	 pick-ups,	 an	 outcome	 that	 did	 not	 change	




considerations	 with	 economic	 ones.237	 	 Hence,	 sanctions,	 even	 small	
ones—can	crowd	out	intrinsic	motivation.238		In	addition,	sanctions	may	
be	perceived	as	a	 sign	 that	noncompliance	 is	widespread,	undermine	











third-party	 complicity.	 	 What	 form	 should	 this	 private	 enforcement	
take?		Existing	mechanisms	prohibit,	authorize,	or	mandate	particular	
action.	 	First,	 the	 law	may	prohibit	 third	parties	 from	participating	 in	
fraud.	 	One	example	is	aiding	and	abetting	liability,	whereby	one	who	
aids	 another	 in	 committing	 fraud	 can	 be	 found	 guilty	 of	 the	 crime.		
Second,	the	law	may	authorize	third	parties	to	take	action,	as	in	the	case	
of	qui	tam	lawsuits.		Finally,	the	law	may	mandate	an	affirmative	duty,	
such	 as	 whistleblowing	 duties	 or	 gatekeeping	 liability.	 	 This	 Part	
compares	and	assesses	several	private	enforcement	mechanisms	in	the	





















another	 type	of	statutory	authorization—the	qui	 tam	action.	 	Qui	 tam	
actions	involve	private	parties	(“relators”)	bringing	suit	on	behalf	of	the	
government	to	rectify	public	wrongs.241		Other	private	causes	of	action	









suit,	 as	 the	 cost	 of	 bringing	 a	 lawsuit	 is	 typically	 greater	 than	 the	
plaintiff’s	pro	rata	benefit.242	 	Given	 the	morally	ambiguous	nature	of	
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A	 related	mechanism	of	 private	 enforcement—whistleblowing—
involves	 a	 statutorily	 imposed	 duty	 on	 third	 parties	 to	 disclose	
misconduct.		A	whistleblower	is	“[a]n	employee	who	reports	employer	
wrongdoing	 to	 a	 governmental	 or	 law-enforcement	 agency.”245	 	 The	
definition	 has	 since	 expanded	 to	 include	 “other	 person[s]	 in	 a	
contractual	 relationship	with	 a	 company	who	 report[]	misconduct	 to	
outside	 firms	 or	 institutions.”246	 	 Some	 well-known	 whistleblower	
provisions	 include	 those	 contained	 in	 the	 False	 Claims	 Act	 (FCA),	
Whistleblower	 Protection	 Act,247	 the	 Occupational	 Safety	 and	 Health	
Act,	Surface	Transportation	Assistance	Act,	Federal	Railroad	Safety	Act,	
and	Sarbanes-Oxley	Act.248		Whistleblowing	statutes	seek	to	incentivize	
third	 parties	 to	 disclose	 misconduct	 through	 monetary	 rewards	 and	
protection	from	retaliation.		For	instance,	the	FCA	imposes	liability	on	
individuals	 and	 companies	 who	 defraud	 the	 federal	 government.249		
Whistleblowers	 must	 be	 made	 whole,	 which	 would	 include	





Some	 evidence	 exists	 that	 these	 safeguards	 and	 incentives	 have	
had	their	intended	effect.		For	the	fiscal	year	ending	September	2019,	of	
the	over	$3	billion	recovered	for	fraud	and	false	claims	under	the	False	
Claims	 Act,	 over	 $2.1	 billion,	 or	 70	 percent,	 was	 recovered	 in	 cases	
initiated	 by	 whistleblowers.251	 	 The	 Securities	 and	 Exchange	
Commission	 (SEC)	 “has	 awarded	 over	 $500	million	 to	 83	 individuals	
since	 issuing	 its	 first	 award	 in	 2012.”252	 	 Whistleblowers	 qualify	 for	
awards	when	 they	provide	 “original,	 timely	 and	 credible	 information	
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Street	 Reform	 and	 Consumer	 Protection	 Act	 	 (“Dodd-Frank	 Act”)	
protects	 the	 confidentiality	 of	 whistleblowers	 and	 grants	 awards	
ranging	 from	10	 to	30	percent	of	 the	 funds	collected	when	monetary	
sanctions	exceed	$1	million.254		Prohibitions	against	retaliation	include	
protection	 against	 discharge,	 demotion,	 suspension,	 harassment,	 or	
adverse	 consequences	 in	 the	 terms	and	 conditions	of	 employment.255		
The	Dodd-Frank	Act	authorizes	the	SEC	to	take	action	against	employers	
who	retaliate	against	whistleblowers.		It	also	creates	a	private	right	of	
action	 that	 allows	 whistleblowers	 to	 sue	 their	 employers	 in	 federal	
court	and	seek	double	back	pay	with	interest,	reinstatement,	reasonable	
attorneys’	fees,	and	reimbursement	for	certain	costs.256	
	Despite	 such	 protections,	 whistleblowing	 suffers	 from	 inherent	
limitations.		First,	whistleblowing	accounts	for	a	relatively	small	fraction	
of	 fraud	 that	 is	 uncovered.	 	 For	 instance,	 according	 to	 the	
PricewaterhouseCoopers	 2018	 Global	 Economic	 Crime	 and	 Fraud	
Survey,	 whistleblowing	 hotlines	 accounted	 for	 7	 percent	 of	 total	
detected	 fraud	 and	 internal	 and	 external	 tip-offs	 accounted	 for	 20	
percent.257	 	 By	 contrast,	 corporate	 controls	 detected	 52	 percent	 of	
frauds,	 law	 enforcement	 uncovered	 4	 percent,	 and	 8	 percent	 were	
discovered	by	accident.258		Second,	only	a	small	fraction	of	cases	results	
in	 awards.	 	Although	 civil	 recoveries	 for	 fraud	under	 the	FCA	 totaled	
over	 $2.1	 billion	 for	 the	 fiscal	 year	 ending	 September	 2019,259	
approximately	 80	 percent	 of	 cases	 filed	 under	 it	 resulted	 in	 no	
reward.260	 	 Similarly,	 although	 the	 SEC’s	 whistleblower	 program	 has	
awarded	approximately	$387	million	since	its	inception,	those	rewards	
have	 gone	 to	 only	 sixty-seven	 individuals.	 	 By	 comparison,	 the	
Commission	received	over	5200	whistleblower	tips	in	fiscal	year	2019	
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Business	 Ethics	 Survey,	 44	 percent	 of	 employees	 who	 reported	
misconduct	 nevertheless	 reported	 being	 retaliated	 against.262		
Retaliation	was	 the	most	 frequently	 filed	complaint	with	 the	EEOC	 in	
fiscal	year	2019,	at	53.8	percent	of	all	charges	filed.263		Congress	directed	
that	 agencies	 protect	 whistleblowers	 against	 retaliation,	 but	 the	
Secretary	 of	 Labor	 has	 proven	 reluctant	 in	 litigating	 whistleblower	
retaliation	 claims,	 leaving	 it	 to	 private	 parties	 to	 litigate	 amongst	
themselves.264		
In	 addition	 to	 these	 resource	 and	 enforcement	 limitations,	
whistleblowing	 imposes	 psychological	 and	 emotional	 costs	 that	 are	
more	 difficult	 to	 quantify.	 	 Society	 continues	 to	 stigmatize	




one’s	 colleagues	 and	 clients.	 	 Those	 who	 are	 discovered	 experience	
difficulties	attracting	business	or	finding	alternative	employment.267		As	
a	case	in	point,	Pav	Gill—Wirecard’s	whistleblower	who	exposed	one	of	
Europe’s	 biggest	 corporate	 frauds—was	 presented	 with	 a	 choice	 of	
resigning	with	a	positive	reference	or	being	fired.		Even	after	resigning,	
he	 was	 targeted	 “professionally”	 and	 “emotionally,”	 given	 bad	
references,	and	publicly	attacked	for	having	“malicious	intent.”268		In	a	
later	 interview,	 Pav	 stated,	 “I	 don’t	 like	 the	 term	 whistleblower,	
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a	 powerful	 incentive	 to	 withhold	 information	 from	 potential	
whistleblowers	and	to	refrain	from	transacting	with	anyone	of	suspect	
loyalties.”270	 	 The	 result	 is	 an	 erosion	 of	 trust	 that	 can	 undermine	
compliance	and	enforcement	efforts.	
3.		Traditional	Fraud	Gatekeepers	
These	 drawbacks	 point	 to	 the	 comparative	 advantage	 of	
gatekeeper	 liability	 regimes.	 	 Gatekeepers—attorneys,	 accountants,	
credit	rating	agencies,	investment	bankers,	and	other	intermediaries—
can	 disrupt	 misconduct	 by	 withholding	 cooperation.271	 	 At	 least	 in	
theory,	 they	 serve	 as	 “independent	 professionals	 who	 pledge	 their	
reputational	 capital”	 in	 order	 “to	 protect	 the	 interests	 of	 dispersed	
investors	 who	 cannot	 easily	 take	 collective	 action.”272	 	 Unlike	
whistleblowers,	 the	 law	 punishes	 gatekeepers	 for	 reneging	 on	 their	
statutory	 obligations,	 rather	 than	 rewarding	 them	 for	 compliance.273		
Reputational	 concerns	 also	 provide	 a	 powerful	 incentive	 for	
gatekeepers	 to	 report	 wrongdoing.	 	 By	 certifying	 disclosures	 and	
verifying	 the	 accuracy	 of	 representations	made	 by	 their	 clients,	 they	





acquiesce	 in	 misconduct,	 whether	 through	 active	 collaboration	 or	
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games	 at	 Enron	 Field	 and	 take	 turns	 buying	 margaritas	 at	
Mama	Ninfa’s,	a	local	Mexican	restaurant	chain.	They	played	
fantasy	 football	 against	 each	 other	 over	 the	 office	
computers.277	
Andersen	 routinely	 signed	 off	 on	 Enron’s	 use	 of	 off-balance-sheet	
partnerships	 to	 conceal	debt	 and	 inflate	profits.	 	 Even	after	 concerns	
began	 to	 rise	 and	 Enron’s	 shares	 plummeted,	 Duncan	 and	 his	 team	
remained	loyal	to	Enron,	shredding	more	than	a	ton	of	documents	and	
deleting	roughly	30,000	emails	and	computer	files.278	
The	 interlocking	web	of	 personal	 relationships	 that	 characterize	
many	 business	 partnerships	 create	 conditions	 ripe	 for	 gatekeeper	
complicity	in	fraud.		Stories	such	as	Andersen’s	are	all	too	common.		A	
similar	 dynamic	 was	 at	 play	 between	WorldCom	 and	 its	 investment	
bank,	Salomon	Smith	Barney,	Citigroup’s	brokerage	unit.		WorldCom’s	
Bernie	 Ebbers	 and	 Jack	 Grubman,	 a	 star	 Salomon	 Smith	 Barney	
telecommunications	 analyst,	 shared	 a	 close	 relationship.	 	 Grubman	
boasted	of	attending	Ebbers’	wedding	in	1999	and	became	part	of	his	
inner	 circle,	 routinely	 attending	 WorldCom	 board	 meetings.279	 	 In	
addition	 to	 aggressively	 promoting	 WorldCom’s	 stock	 and	 lending	
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Dodd-Frank	 Act,282	 and	 numerous	 agency	 regulations.283	 	 Firms	 have	
also	implemented	various	self-regulatory	solutions,	such	as	erecting	so	
called	 “Chinese	 walls”—virtual	 information	 barriers	 to	 structurally	
isolate	individuals	with	privileged	information	and	separate	units	with	
conflicts	of	interest.284		
Although	 these	 reforms	 may	 have	 addressed	 some	 of	 the	 more	
egregious	 abuses,	 gatekeeper	 complicity	 in	 fraud	 has	 stubbornly	
persisted.		For	instance,	in	March	2018,	the	SEC	charged	Merrill	Lynch	
with	 failure	 to	 properly	 perform	 its	 gatekeeping	 duties	 in	 the	
unregistered	 sales	 of	 nearly	 $38	 million	 in	 securities	 of	 Longtop	
Financial	 Technological	 Limited	 (“Longtop”).285	 	 Merrill	 allegedly	
ignored	numerous	red	flags	indicating	that	the	sales	could	be	part	of	an	
unlawful	 unregistered	 distribution,	 including	 an	 online	 report	 that	
accused	Longtop	of	 financial	 fraud.286	 	Similarly,	 in	October	2016,	 the	
SEC	charged	Ernst	&	Young	(“E&Y”)	with	failing	to	question	numerous	
suspicious	tax	adjustments	in	its	audit	of	Weatherford	International.287		
E&Y	 also	 violated	 auditor	 independence	 requirements,	 including	
“excessively	 friendly”	 relations	 between	 the	 E&Y	 partner	 and	 Chief	
Financial	Officer	of	the	client,	such	as	“taking	frequent,	overnight	out-of-
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fraudulent	 attorney	 opinion	 letters	 in	 connection	 with	 registering	





The	 limitations	 of	 relying	 on	 traditional	 fraud	 gatekeepers	













of	 the	 personal	 networks	 that	 facilitate	 prosocially	motivated	 fraud?		
One	 intriguing	 possibility	 is	 the	 insurance	 industry.	 	 Fraud	 loss	
insurance,	also	known	as	business	crime	insurance	or	commercial	crime	
insurance,	 provides	 coverage	 for	 losses	 due	 to	 employee	 dishonesty,	
fraud,	 embezzlement,	 theft,	 robbery,	 forgery,	 computer	 fraud,	 or	 any	
other	business	crime.292		Enlisting	insurers	as	gatekeepers	is	not	a	new	















Similarly,	 the	 Employee	 Retirement	 Income	 Security	 Act	 (ERISA)	

















ability	 to	 regulate	 behavior	 notwithstanding	 the	 perils	 of	 moral	
hazard.297	 	 Insurance	 companies	 have	 a	 litany	 of	 tools	 available	 to	
protect	 against	 moral	 hazard	 and	 manage	 risk,	 including	 premium	
differentials,	 deductibles,	 coinsurance,	 exclusions,	 and	 experience	
ratings.298	 	 A	 deductible	 involves	 a	 certain	 amount	 of	 expense	 being	
excluded	from	coverage.		Coinsurance	involves	requiring	the	insured	to	
pay	 part	 of	 each	 dollar	 of	 cost.299	 	 By	 imposing	 part	 of	 the	 cost	 on	
insureds,	they—at	least	theoretically—would	be	incentivized	to	prevent	
harms.	 	 Because	 insurers	 can	 lower	 payouts	 and	 increase	 profits	 by	


















prevention	 measures.300	 	 Insurers	 who	 lower	 risk	 can	 offer	 lower	
premiums	 and	 attract	 more	 customers.	 	 By	 managing	 risk,	 they	 can	
influence	 policies,	 practices,	 and	 procedures	 that	 in	 turn	 impact	
behavior.301	 	 Despite	 the	 dangers	 of	 moral	 hazard,	 insurers	 may	 be	
better	 positioned	 than	 government	 regulators	 and	 traditional	 fraud	




Insurers	 may	 be	 better	 equipped	 than	 government	 monitors	 to	
translate	ambiguous	standards	into	more	rule-like	requirements.		First,	
their	policy-making	process	is	often	far	more	flexible	than	the	types	of	
lawmaking	 processes	 available	 to	 the	 government.	 	 Governments	
require	legislative	majorities	or	burdensome	administrative	rulemaking	
processes,	 such	 as	 the	 federal	 notice-and-comment	 rulemaking	
process.302	 	 Moreover,	 when	 governments	 promulgate	 rule-like	
requirements,	 those	requirements	remain	static	until	revised	through	
future	legislation	or	administrative	process.	 	By	contrast,	insurers	can	
promulgate	 and	 revise	 their	 policy	 requirements	 either	 by	 fiat,	
assuming	 clients	 accept	 the	 revisions,	 or	 by	 negotiation.	 	 In	 those	








have	penalties	 at	 their	 disposal	 that	 are	 not	 available	 to	 government	
actors.303		Available	sanctions	include	raising	the	price	at	which	a	policy	
is	 renewed,	 raising	 premiums,	 or	 dropping	 coverage	 entirely.	 	 The	
organization	 suffers	 higher	 costs	 for	 failing	 to	monitor	 its	 employees	












insurer	do	not	 include	the	possibility	of	 imprisonment,	 the	stakes	are	
also	lower.		
Third,	insurers	have	greater	flexibility	than	governments	to	tailor	
their	 policies	 to	 individual	 circumstances	 or	 industries.	 	 Government	
actors	typically	face	pressure	for	equal	treatment	that	limits	their	ability	
to	tailor	legal	requirements.		An	agency	regulating	an	entire	industry	can	
tailor	 at	 the	 industry	 level,	 but	would	 face	 resistance	 to	 tailoring	 its	
policies	to	individual	companies	or	groups	of	companies.304		An	agency	
regulating	multiple	 industries,	 or	 differently-situated	 actors	 within	 a	
single	 industry,	will	 have	more	difficulty	 tailoring	 legal	 requirements	
even	at	an	industry	level.		Insurers	are	unlikely	to	face	these	pressures	
at	the	same	level.		Dissatisfied	clients	would	always	have	the	option	of	
seeking	 alternative	 coverage	 if	 they	 feel	 they	 have	 been	 treated	
unfairly.305	
These	 advantages	 have	 already	 been	 leveraged	 to	 privately	
regulate	 public	 action.	 	 Take,	 for	 instance,	 police	 liability	 insurance:	
municipalities	 now	 routinely	 purchase	 insurance	 to	 indemnify	
themselves	 in	 the	 event	 they	 are	 sued	 for	 common	 law	 and	
constitutional	 torts	 committed	 by	 their	 police	 officers.306	 	 Because	
insurers	benefit	from	risk	reduction	measures	taken	by	insureds	after	a	
policy	is	issued,	insurers	have	an	incentive	to	reduce	risk.		By	translating	
vague	 governmental	 standards	 into	 rule-like	 requirements,	 insurers	
provide	 the	 insureds	with	 concrete	 standards	of	 conduct.	 	They	have	
done	 so	 by	 implementing	 detailed	 policies;	 distributing	 educational	





After	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 rejected	 a	 Fourth	 Amendment	 challenge	 to	
strip	 searches	of	 imprisoned	detainees	 in	Florence	v.	Board	of	Chosen	
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Freeholders,	 one	 major	 reinsurer	 clarified	 that	 a	 reasonable	 search	
“should	be	conducted	in	a	professional	manner	using	a	searcher	of	the	






requirements	 for	 ascertaining	 fault,	 causation,	 and	 loss.312	 	 They	 also	
impose	safety	standards	that	are	stricter	than	standards	required	by	the	
government.	 	 Environmental	 liability	 insurers,	 for	 instance,	 either	
require	or	offer	premium	discounts	for	implementation	of	private	safety	





In	 addition,	 insurers	 may	 be	 better	 positioned	 to	 detect	
incremental	changes	in	behavior.		Insurers	often	have	access	to	detailed	
data	about	the	industries	they	regulate.		In	the	process	of	underwriting,	
they	 acquire	 and	 process	 vast	 amounts	 of	 information	 about	 their	
insureds.		They	are	in	the	business	of	acquiring,	sorting,	and	evaluating	
complex	and	sophisticated	information.		They	use	this	data	to	assess	and	
price	 the	 impact	 of	 different	 precautions	 and	 to	 generate	 detailed	
policies	 with	 tiered,	 differentiated	 premiums	 that	 correlate	 with	
different	levels	of	risk.315	 	Insurers,	after	all,	cannot	operate	profitably	
unless	 they	 can	make	 accurate	 actuarial	 determinations	 on	which	 to	
price	their	policies.		Ex	post,	insurers	operate	vast	networks	of	adjustors	
who	 investigate,	 compute,	 and	 negotiate	 claims	 using	 standardized	
charts	and	tables	to	quantify	nonpecuniary	losses.316		
Moreover,	clients	may	be	more	willing	to	provide	 information	to	
their	 insurers	 than	 to	 governments.	 	 Disclosure	 of	 information	 to	


















Insurers’	 expertise	 in	 minutiae	 and	 incremental	 change	 could	
easily	be	leveraged	to	tackle	incremental	dishonesty.		Insurers	not	only	
have	 the	 infrastructure	 to	 detect	 low-level	 cheating,	 but	 also	 can	
regulate	 conduct	 that	 is	 too	 de	 minimis	 to	 trigger	 legal	 sanctions.		
Insurers	have	proven	adept	at	regulating	in	the	interstices	of	law,	often	
imposing	 standards	 of	 conduct	 that	 are	 higher	 than	 what	 the	 law	
requires.	 	 Dishonesty	 is	 not	 illegal,	 and	 fraud	 results	 in	 liability	 only	
when	intent	to	deceive,	reliance,	and	loss	can	be	proven.		But	insurers	
have	 tools	 at	 their	 disposal	 that	 go	 beyond	 what	 is	 available	 to	
governmental	actors.		For	instance,	insurers	impose	harsh	sanctions	on	
individuals	 who	 misrepresent	 information	 on	 their	 insurance	
applications.	 These	 sanctions	 can	 range	 from	 increased	 premiums	 to	
loss	of	coverage,	fines,	and	other	penalties.		The	threat	of	enforcement	
is	real,	as	insurers	employ	a	vast	network	of	claims	adjusters	and	other	
representatives	 to	monitor	 compliance	with	 various	 government	 and	
insurer-imposed	guidelines	and	rules.318	
iii.		Third-Party	Complicity	




automatons	 intent	on	maximizing	profits	by	 finding	pretexts	 to	avoid	
paying	 legitimate	 claims.319	 	 A	 study	 commissioned	 by	 the	 American	
Association	for	Justice	found	that	insurance	companies	routinely	go	to	
extreme	 lengths	 to	 avoid	 paying	 claims,	 including	 lying,	 forging	
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who	do	not	accept	 initial	 lowball	offers	receive	what	 is	known	as	 the	
“boxing	 gloves”	 strategy:	 deny,	 delay,	 and	 defend.320	 	 Distrust	 of	 the	
insurance	industry	has	also	been	fueled	by	corporate	scandals	involving	
bid	rigging,	price-fixing,	collusion,	and	improper	accounting	methods.321		
For	 instance,	 in	 2004,	 New	 York	 filed	 a	 civil	 suit	 against	 Marsh	 &	
McLennan,	 the	world’s	 largest	 insurance	 broker,	 for	 rigging	 bids	 and	
steering	business	to	insurers	that	paid	it	the	largest	incentives,	known	
as	“contingent	commissions.”		In	2006,	AIG,	the	world’s	largest	insurer,	
paid	 over	 $1.6	 billion	 to	 settle	 charges	 of	 improper	 accounting,	 bid	
rigging,	 securities	 fraud,	 and	 improper	 practices	 involving	 workers’	
compensation	funds.322	
Paradoxically,	 the	 mix	 of	 contempt,	 revulsion,	 and	 distrust	 of	
insurance	agents	and	the	insurance	industry	more	generally	could	be	an	





laws	 such	 as	 the	 Sarbanes-Oxley	 Act,	 which	 regulates	 the	 role	 of	
gatekeepers	more	 generally,	 insurers’	 independence	 could	be	 further	
bolstered.		
The	 emergence	 of	 insurers	 as	 private	 monitors	 of	 fraudulent	
activity	 holds	 at	 least	 some	 promise.	 	 Insurers	 have	 the	 resources,	




the	 emotional	 and	 social	 ties	 that	 have	 heretofore	 hindered	 robust	
enforcement	could	be	a	potentially	fruitful	avenue.		But	the	dangers	of	
moral	 hazard	 are	 real,	 and	 the	 enlistment	 of	 private	 insurers	 is	 no	
panacea.		Other	strategies	to	counteract	the	problem	of	prosocial	fraud	
include	 enhancing	 private	 aiding	 and	 abetting	 liability,	 implementing	
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religious	 and	 family	 background,	 culture,	 education,	 and	 upbringing,	
only	forms	part	of	the	story.		Prosocial	fraud	is	embedded	in	structures	
of	 social	 relations	 that	 are	 inadequately	 accounted	 for	 in	 the	 current	
legal	framework.		Motives	matter.		A	person’s	intentions	influence	both	




allows	 individuals	 to	 supplant	 one	 source	 of	 morality—honesty	 and	
integrity—with	 another—kindness	 and	 benevolence.	 	 This	
rationalization	 process	 undermines	 the	 deterrent	 impact	 of	 legal	
sanctions.	 	 The	 moral	 ambiguity	 of	 prosocial	 fraud,	 combined	 with	
cognitive	 biases	 such	 as	 self-deception	 and	motivated	 blindness,	 not	
only	 provides	 an	 alternate	 source	 of	 intrinsic	 motivation,	 but	 also	
weakens	the	operation	of	social	sanctions.		
The	Article	has	suggested	that	the	ends	of	the	legal	system	may	be	
better	 attained	 not	 by	 increasing	 sanctions,	 but	 by	 exploring	
supplemental	mechanisms	of	ex	ante	private	enforcement.	 	We	are	all	
capable	of	ethical	lapses,	whether	in	the	commission	of	the	offense	or	
through	complicity	 in	 its	propagation.	 	A	certain	measure	of	humility,	
combined	with	recognition	that	prosociality	can	operate	in	unexpected	
ways,	would	be	a	necessary	antecedent	to	crafting	an	effective	solution.		
Ultimately,	 the	 deterrent	 aims	 of	 the	 current	 doctrinal	 framework	
cannot	be	fully	achieved	without	an	appreciation	for—and	accounting	
of—the	impact	of	social	ties	and	social	motives	on	fraudulent	behavior.		
	
